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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY
SERVICE IN ISRAEL: DoEs THE
INDIVIDUAL STAND A CHANCE?
Leonard Hammer
"Consente i% but a bborb thjat tW1arbo uoe,
]ebi b at first to keep the trong in awe:
Our otrong arm be our ongiente, fftorh our W."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to conscientiously oppose a state law on the basis that the
law abridges one's morals illustrates the delicate balance between a state's
need for control and its respect for an individual citizen's beliefs. Can a
state allow its citizens to act upon their conscientious convictions in
opposition to the state's laws and legal framework? A state's treatment of
conscientious objectors can serve as a litmus test for determining the role
of the individual within the state and can provide a practical distinction as
to when to abide by a state law conflicting with an individual's rights.
This Article addresses conscientious objection2 to military service in
Israel. The Israeli military, one of the most respected institutions in the
State of Israel, has a pervasive influence on most public and private
decisions. All eligible male citizens are required, at the age of eighteen,
to serve in the Israeli army for thirty months.3 Yearly reserve duty is
mandated for all males up to the age of fifty-five.4
While Israel's very existence is rooted in a secure military, 5 an
* Professor, Modern Hebrew Literature, Carmel College, England.
1. WILM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING RICHARD IIl Act 5, sc.
3.
2. See discussion infra note 63 (defining conscientious objection and discussing
historical reasons for allowing the claim).
3. DEFENCE SERVICE LAW § 11(1) (Isr.).
4. Id. §§ 19, 21.
5. The ramifications of the recent Israel-PLO agreement will be considered when
addressing the extent of the military's necessity for all available individuals. See
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COM. L.
individual soldier is still confronted with choices of death between oneself
and others. For one who finds it impossible to carry out particular tasks,
denial of an application for conscientious objection entails a great sacrifice
which has been termed a "costly" obedience.6
While other countries may grant an individual the active right to
object to military duty,7 in Israel such right is closely connected to the
government due to the requirement that it be approved by the Minister of
Defence.8  In light of this governmental control, the conscientious
objector's actions and the government's reaction will create political
consequences as well. This Article, however, does not attempt to address
the complex political facets of conscientious objection in Israel. Rather,
the Article focuses on the initial right exercised by the individual, since the
objector's goal is neither to alter the composition of the state nor to create
a lasting political impression.9
discussion infra part ll.B. 1.
6. David A.J. Richards, Conscience, Human Rights and the Anarchist Challenge to
the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771, 784 (1984).
7. For example, in the United States, an individual objecting to military duty must
satisfy three requirements. First, the individual must demonstrate opposition to all war
in any form. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Second, the objection
must be grounded on "religious" principles. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (construing "religious principles"
to include pacifism and/or objection to war in any form). Third, the objector's
convictions must be sincere. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); see also
32 C.F.R. § 1636.4 (1991) (defining "religious principles" to include "personal beliefs
that are purely ethical or moral in source or content as long as the beliefs are parallel to
that believed by those who believe in a Supreme Being."). In the United States, once
the applicant's beliefs are recognized by a Military Review Board, the military then must
prove, with a "basis in fact," that the applicant is not a conscientious objector.
Essentially, the military must demonstrate that the applicant's activities are other than as
stated. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 382. Note that the federal courts have differed as to the
exact boundaries of this test. Compare Silverthorne v. Laird, 400 F.2d 1175, 1179 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("there must be some facts in his application, hard provable reliable facts, that
provide a basis for disbelieving the applicant") and Taylor v. Clayton, 601 F.2d 1102,
1103 (9th Cir. 1979) ("basis in fact test is the narrowest review in the law") with
Goodrich v. Marsh, 659 F. Supp. 855, 857 (W.D. Ky 1987) (court must review record
and carefully scrutinize logic and reasoning of the military board).
8. See DEFENCE SERVICE LAW § 36 (Isr.).
9. The conscientious objector is acting out of internal conscientious directives. See
infra note 63. Political results are not initially a goal, especially for an individual
conscientious objector. The difference is apparent in the decisions of the Israeli Supreme
Court. See, e.g., H.C.(H-igh Court) 734 Shein v. Minister of Defence, 30(3) P.D. 393
(1984) (appellant objected solely to the war in Lebanon, an offensive attack that was the
subject of a great deal of political criticism in Israel). For a complete discussion of the
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Israeli Supreme Court decisions are analyzed to discern the underlying
basis for conscientious objection to military service in Israel. The
principles relied upon in the Israeli Supreme Court decisions not only
reflect the desires and policies of the army, but also serve as an objective
body's determination as to the status of the conscientious objector under
Israeli law. The Court is not limited in its scope of examination in the
same manner that a military body may be, since the Court can consider
both practical and jurisprudential bases.'0
Upon examining the status of conscientious objection to military
service in Israel, this Article analyzes how conscientious objection can
exist within a formal state setting and the extent of the individual's moral
obligation to the state. Israeli law is then reviewed to better understand
the boundaries established by the Israeli authorities, along with the factors
to be considered when confronting a conscientious objection issue.
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN ISRAEL
A. Statutory Underpinnings
Section 36 of the Defence Service Law states that the Minister of
political aspects of conscientious objection in Israel (both in the military and in general),
see LEON SHELEFF, THE VOICE OF HONOR: CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND Civic LOYALTY
123-46 (1989).
Currently, the political quagmire of objection in Israel is reflected by an organization
called "Yesh Gevul." This organization serves as a support center for conscientious
objectors who do not wish to serve in the occupied territories. While it might be
perceived as a quasi-political body (since the group can be considered a collective attempt
to influence the Israel government into ceasing activity in these areas), the members
individually reached their decision not to serve in the area and they have a diverse range
of views as to the extent of service to be performed. Essentially, it is their conscience
that prevents them from serving in the occupied territories due to the immoral orders
being carried out and the immoral manner in which the occupation is taking place. See,
e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 264 (1979) (noting that conscientious
objection is a private action by one who wishes to avoid committing a moral wrong).
Hence, the members of the group are, individually, prime examples of (selective)
conscientious objectors. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 380 (1971).
10. As noted in Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire, judicial determinations are a
reliable means of understanding the argumentative character of a legal practice "because
judicial argument about claims of law is a useful paradigm for exploring the central,
propositional aspect of legal practice. . . the structure of judicial argument is typically
more explicit and judicial reasoning has an influence over other forms of legal discourse
that is not fully reciprocal." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15 (1986).
11. The law was redrafted in 1986. The prior law was passed in 1959 and the
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Defence may alter the size of the regular forces or reserve forces for
education, security, national economy matters, family reasons, or "for
other reasons" and
(1) exempt a person of military age from the duty of regular
army service or reduce period of the regular service of a person
of military age; and (2) exempt, for a specific period or
absolutely, a person of military age liable to reserve service from
the duty of reserve service. 12
The phrase, "for other reasons," has been interpreted to include those
individuals who conscientiously oppose military service. 3 The right to
object is not one that can be claimed by the individual; rather, the
government reserves the power to grant conscientious objector status. The
individual claims to be a conscientious objector and the military either
accepts his claim or it is rejected and he is forced to challenge the
military's denial of his claim before the Israeli Supreme Court."
B. Judicial Interpretations
1. An Early Israeli Supreme Court Decision
Military necessity is the central element addressed in Israeli Supreme
Court decisions dealing with conscientious objection. Where the Court
determines that the military denied conscientious objector status on the
basis of military necessity, the Court has generally upheld the decision.
In Elgazi v. Minister of Defence,'5 a number of prospective draftees
corresponding statute, which remains unaltered, was § 28.
12. The final paragraph of § 36 is not relevant to the issue. Note that the law
explicitly allows a woman to claim conscientious objector status. DEFENCE SERVICE LAW
§ 30 (Isr.). This is not, however, an indication that the legislature did not intend male
military members to claim conscientious objector status since the military has recognized
the right in the past and has never relied on this reasoning to deny such status to male
objectors. Rather, as noted above, the right is subject to the discretion of the Minister of
Defence.
13. See Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 393.
14. See COURTS LAw, 1957 § 7 (Isr.) (enabling one to appear, in the first instance,
before the Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice should the individual desire
that an elected official or public body act, or refrain from acting, in a given situation).
15. H.C. 470/80 (1980) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of
International and Comparative Law) [hereinafter H.C. 470/80].
296 [Vol. 14
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refused to be drafted unless they were guaranteed that they would not have
to serve in the West Bank and Gaza ("Occupied Territories"). Their
stated purpose was to contribute to peace in the territories. 6 Following
a number of individual settlements where members were permitted to
forego service in the Occupied Territories, 7 Elgazi, the sole remaining
objector, requested to serve as a teacher in the military, or in some other
form of group service. 8 Instead, the Israeli army ordered him to serve as
a soldier in a tank division. During the final stages of his training, Elgazi
refused to participate in training activities in the Occupied Territories, due
to his belief that the occupation was immoral.' 9 He was imprisoned on
five occasions.2" The army declined to recognize Elgazi's right to resist
service, and rejected his attempts at a compromise, whereby he agreed to
finish training outside the Occupied Territories.2' Elgazi then appealed to
the Supreme Court claiming he had been a victim of discrimination, since
other objectors had been granted exemptions.
The Court, in turn, referred to the military's newly-instituted policy
for conscientious objectors, which relied considerably on "militarynecessity."22 Prior to 1980, the military generally granted an exemption
to a conscientious objector if the individual possessed a bona fide personal
16. Id. at 1. Note the difference between conscientious objection and civil
disobedience, in that the basis for the protestor's actions was to object to the oppression
of the Palestinian people. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04; see also Yoram
Shachar, The Elgazi Trials-Selective Conscientious Objection in Israel, 12 ISR.Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 214, 226-228 (1982). While their actions might have come across as civil
disobedience since they desired to contribute towards peace, their basis for objecting was
the belief that the occupation was morally unjustified. Shachar noted that while the
group's actions were a sort of mixture of both conscientious objection and civil
disobedience, the group did not attempt any political or legal change, although a shift in
government policy was desired. Id. at 216-17. More importantly, in the context of
analyzing conscientious objection, Elgazi remained as the sole objector following a number
of quiet settlements with the other group members. This should have altered the military's
perception of Elgazi as a conscientious objector since the threat to the army was by one
lone individual who was acting out of conscientious reasons in his refusal to serve. He
did not require the group to bolster or act in accordance with his beliefs, which centered
on what he felt to be the immoral occupation of the Occupied Territories.
17. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 2.
18. District Court Martial for the Armoured Corps, File 173/80, Military Advocate
v. Elgazi 7 (1980) (unreported) [hereinafter Military Advocate v. ElgaziJ (on file with the
New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
19. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 2.
20. Id.
21. Military Advocate v. Elgazi, supra note 18, at 7.
22. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 2.
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belief against military service. Since this was only a sporadic occurrence,
the military was prepared to allow such claims;2" however, due to a recent
increase in organized group protests, the army decided to alter such
practice.24
The Court held that if the army had made decisions on a case-by-case
basis in the past, there was no reason why the military could not impose
general rules on all individuals.25 The Court stated that it did not matter
what motivated the military in creating the changes or whether such
modifications were reasonable, but whether the army acted in a
discriminatory manner.26 However, the Court did recognize that while the
army might have its own reasons for changing policy, deviations within
the army might occur and discrimination would result. Nonetheless, the
Court held that the issue of altering policy was an internal military
decision.27 Furthermore, the Court recognized that while a conscientious
objection is still a viable claim, which the military will decide on the
ground of necessity, the military policy should not be applied in a
discriminatory fashion.2"
The Court noted that although the means instituted by the military
might not lead to the desired ends,29 military needs might be an overriding
concern;3" further, the personal motivation of the individual must succumb
to the public necessity should the military determine that the effect of a
protest or action would damage the army.31 Indeed, humanity would be
better served by having such individuals serve in the Occupied Territories
as a means of improving relations and ensuring that moral standards are
upheld.32 The military cannot function if it is subject to individual soldiers
23. Id.
24. Id. Note that Professor Shachar outlines the various options that were available
to the military at this juncture in its treatment of conscientious objectors (for example,
upholding discriminatory treatment of conscientious objectors on the grounds that each
situation was a unique case). The army chose to alter its policy since it was the easiest,
most efficient and best long-term option available. See Shachar, supra note 16, at 223-26.
25. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
28. id.
29. For example, forcing a soldier to serve or placing a soldier in jail in lieu of
service will not bolster the military's military necessity justification. Id.
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who determine where and when they are to serve either for economic,
social, or conscientious reasons."
Following the reasoning of the Court, one can assume that certain
individuals may refuse to serve for reasons of conscience. If the military
desired an outright rejection of conscientious objection status, it would
have argued so. As noted by the Court in Elgazi, conscientious objection
must be taken into account for those whose moral beliefs actually forbid
any kind of military service.34
2. Recent Interpretation by the Israeli Supreme Court
In a more recent case, the Court again denied status to a conscientious
objector. 5 In Shein v. Minister of Defence, Shein for reasons of
conscience, objected to military service in Lebanon, as he deemed Israel's
involvement in the war illegal and violative of the basic underlying
justifications for military behavior. 6 Shein's claim was denied in two
military hearings and he was sentenced to thirty-five days in jail." After
serving the sentence, he was again summoned for reserve duty. He
refused on the same grounds and contended that his stay in jail for thirty-
33. Id. Elgazi was then court martialed following his refusal to continue training and
sentenced to one year in jail. Elgazi's defense centered on § 22 of the Criminal Law,
which exempts one from criminal liability for not committing an act that could cause
damage to, among other things, one's "honor." Military Advocate v. Elgazi, supra note
18, at 6. Elgazi defined "honor" as including conscientious reasons as well. The Military
Court rejected this interpretation, stating that the law is the final word and one cannot
reject a law for conscientious reasons. Id. at 8. The necessity defense is an objective
determination that is to be viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. Hence,
subjective conscientious objection does not allow for a necessity defense justifying a
refusal to obey the law. For a complete discussion of the § 22 necessity defense and its
relation to conscientious objection to the military, see Leon Sheleff, Disobeying the Law
for Reasons of Conscience, CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAIM H.
COHEN 117, 137-47 (Gavison ed., 1982) (Professor Sheleff, who represented Elgazi for
his court martial, also discusses the underlying basis for conscientious objection and civil
disobedience); see also Shachar, supra note 16, at 232-50. While necessity can be a valid
defense, the focus of this Article is to understand the position of the military and courts
regarding conscientious objection, not a possible defense available to objectors.
34. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 4-5.
35. Shein v. Minister of Defence, 30(3) P.D. 393 (1984).
36. Id. at 395. Although Shein referred to his actions as civil disobedience, he was
in theory a conscientious objector. His objections were based on a personal conscientious
objection to Israel's military operation. No mention was made of his desire to alter state
policy nor did he attempt a group protest, two desired outcomes of civil disobedience.
37. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 395.
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five days should count towards his reserve duty time in southern
Lebanon.3" He was then ordered to serve twenty-eight days of reserve
duty in southern Lebanon. 9 Shein refused to serve and was, once again,
incarcerated. He appealed the military's order to the Supreme Court on
two grounds: (1) his jail time was not in accordance with the law and
should count towards reserve time; and (2) he was a conscientious
objector, and therefore, should be exempt from service.4
Shein claimed that the army discriminated against him and was
indirectly punishing him by not allowing him a forty-two day delay
between jail and reserve duty similar to the policy for other reserve
soldiers.4 ' The army contended that it was concerned with a lowering of
morale and an overall outbreak of objections to service in Lebanon.
Furthermore, the army argued that Shein was undermining the military's
foundation because new soldiers arriving in Lebanon were required to
share in the tasks, thus allowing more leave time for the soldiers already
stationed there.42
The Israeli Supreme Court rejected Shein's claims referring to specific
regulations that granted the military the right to enforce service as it sees
fit.43 Although Section 23 of the Defence Service Law states that a
reservist's period in jail is not calculated towards reserve duty," the
military's internal regulations regard prison time as part of a reservist's
period of duty. 45  The military's regulations also require a reasonable
38. Id.
39. Id. at 396.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 397. Based on the military's argument, it would seem that Shein's reliance
on civil disobedience rather than conscientious objection hindered his case. If he had
claimed that the basis of his actions was conscientious objection, the impact of the
military's stability argument and the threat of group protest would have been minimized
because conscientious objection is a personal, individual belief, rather than a group belief.
The individual does not desire to change the political makeup of the state. See infra text
accompanying note 104.
43. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 397. The Court also noted other sections in the Defence
Service Law that demonstrate the latitude given to the military. Section 19 allows the
commander to order reserve duty at a place and time that the commander sees fit, §§ 20
and 21 allow monthly and yearly variations in reserve duty, while § 26 grants the Minister
of Defence the right to prolong reserve duty service.
44. Unless a military or civilian court declares otherwise.
45. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 398 (referring to chapter 5 § 22(3) of the army regulations).
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interval both before and between military service.46 The military had
recently revised the regulations to avoid massive protests by explicitly
stating that a conscientious objector's jail time would not be calculated
towards reserve duty and reserve orders would be effective immediately.47
The Court upheld the new regulation, since its purpose was to ensure
that the military's security needs were satisfied.48 The Court, wishing to
separate itself from military policy, did not find the regulation
discriminatory or vengeful, since the recent change was a reaction to a
fear of protest.49 Allowing one soldier to object affects the military's
value and strength as well as the morale of fellow army personnel, since
one missing soldier increases the burden of service for the remainder of
the soldiers."
The Court distinguished between the jail time imposed on one who
commits a crime while in the army5 and the jail time imposed on a
conscientious objector. A crime in the army is considered only an
incidental occurrence that does not affect the foundations of the military.52
However, the army was acting above the law53 by allowing the jail time
of one who is in the army to count towards reserve duty. The act of
conscientious objection, however, is an intentional act whereby the
individual declares that service will not be performed.'" Hence, there is
no basis to reckon the jail period, since it would undermine the security
needs of the army.55
46. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 397-98.
47. Id. at 398. Note that the army had conducted a similar maneuver in Elgazi, when
it narrowed the basis for conscientious objector status. The previous military standard had
been based on determining the bona fide personal belief of the individual against military
duty. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15.
48. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 399.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. When an individual commits a crime while in the army, any jail time served is
included as part of military service.
52. Id. at 400.
53. DEFENCE SERVICE LAW § 23 (Isr.).
54. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 400.
55. Id. The Court noted that another reason was due to the large number of
conscientious objector cases on file at the time, as per the military materials submitted to
the Court (no figures were provided). This argument seems rather weak since it can be
applied in any situation, even for a single conscientious objector. Note that based on an
estimate from "Yesh Gevul," as of June 1990, there were over 100 conscientious
objectors serving time in prison out of around 1500 who identified with the problem in
19931
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Despite the fact that Shein's unit had already served reserve time,56
the Court focused solely on the needs of the military as determined by the
military itself.57 The right to conscientious objection must be determined
based on the specific facts and circumstances. Allowing conscientious
objection at this juncture would undermine the authority of the Israeli
army, especially in light of Israel's dangerous security situation, which is
radically different from other large countries.58
The Court recognized that the Minister of Defence had granted
pacifists an exemption from service in the military.59 Shein's case,
however, differed because his objection was limited to one particular
conflict rather than to war in general.' Since conscientious objection is
the Occupied Territories and/or were willing to refuse to take part in military action in
that area. See YESH GEVUL, THERE IS A LPrr! (1989) [hereinafter YESH GEVUL
PAMPHLET] (on file with the New York Law School Journal of International and
Comparative Law). Nonetheless, the military does not appear to be hindered in its
effectiveness to instill order in the Occupied Territories.
56. Shein might have further impeded military operations as he would have been
placed in a non-customary position.
57. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 400. As to the lag period between jail time and reserve duty
time, the Court stated that while the usual 42 days allowed between service stints is too
much, the army should allow such individuals a short span of time in which to prepare.
Id.
58. Id. at 403. Note that the United States, which is presumably an example of a
larger country to which the Court was referring, has generally recognized conscientious
objection during war situations when all available personnel were necessary to participate
in the military action. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE, THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS 1658-1985 (1986). The conscientious objectors
during the two world wars of this century were generally ordered to carry out alternative
civilian duty. A number of objectors, however, were jailed due to their absolute refusal
to participate in any way towards the war effort. Id. at 26-27, 46-47.
59. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 401-02 (relying on § 28 of the Defence Service Law
(currently § 36) and noting that § 30 of the law explicitly allows conscientious objection
for women).
60. Id. at 401-02. The Court relied on a United States case, Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), and the Selective Service Act § 6 (1967) (currently 32
C.F.R. § 1636.5 (1992)), as well as a United Kingdom law, The National Service Act §§
17-22 (1948), for this point. See supra note 7. One of the contentions in Gillette was that
denying selective objection demonstrated Congress' favoritism towards those religions
which did not participate in all wars. The United States Supreme Court held that there
was no Congressional "religious gerrymandering" since there was a "neutral secular basis
for the lines government has drawn." Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453. The Israeli Supreme
Court did not mention this point although prior Israeli Supreme Court decisions have
upheld the right of those who do not serve due to their religious background. See Baker
v. Minister of Defence, 24(1) P.D. 238 (1970) (Baker was denied standing to challenge
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not an active right,6" objection to a single war should not be allowed
because it prejudices a military's democratic manner62 and leads to
discrimination.63
The Israeli Supreme Court held that the military was justified in
relying on its policy of necessity for every soldier-an objective
determination based on the demands of the military. The underlying
problem is that the Court failed to consider the individualistic beliefs of
the conscientious objector. While the Court might have considered the
beliefs of the citizen in passing," it was only in the context of Israel's
the exemption of yeshiva (loosely translated as Bible) students from serving in the
military. The basis of the exemption was a political decision). See also Resler v.
Minister of Defence, 42(2) P.D. 441 (1980) (Resler contended that the historical
exemption for yeshiva students imposed an unfair burden on those who served). Although
in his original, 1982 application he was denied standing, his second application arose due
to a change in the policy of standing. See ITZHAK ZAMIR, COURTS AND POLITICS IN
ISRAEL PUBLIC LAW 523 (1991). This application was denied as the Court held that the
Minister of Defence acted within his powers. The religion facet will not be discussed as
the latter exemption does not necessarily center on a moral claim. Nonetheless, it looms
as a political problem in the future as the Mayor of Tel Aviv had at one point called on
high school students to refuse military service until yeshiva students serve in the military.
Sara Friedman, "Cheech" to the Students: Do Not Conscript Until the Religious Serve in
the LD.F., MA'ARIV (Tel Aviv), Mar. 13, 1992, at 1. Note as well that Jewish law
allows for selective objection. See discussion infra note 62-63.
61. Conscientious objection is a right in the United States.
62. The Israeli Supreme Court denied selective objection because of the deleterious
political and social consequences it causes to the democratic process. Shein, 30(3) P.D.
at 402.
63. Id. The Court also discussed the Jewish law on conscientious objection as a
reference point. This opinion was written by Justice M. Elon, the foremost authority on
the Mishpat Ivri (generally translated as Halacha, meaning "law"). Justice Elon noted
that the Book of Deuteronomy requires officers of war to exempt certain individuals (such
as newly married couples or new homeowners) from the obligation to serve. Id. at 403.
Various portions from other biblical and exegetical texts, such as Gideon and the
Chashmonaim, also make a similar point. Id. at 404. Justice Elon referred to a slew of
commentators who determined that the exemption was created for the weak, fainthearted,
or those who take great pity on others. Id. "Fear," in the sense that one is hesitant to
serve due to the large amount of religious commandments which have been transgressed,
is also a reason for an exemption. Id. The Court considered these reasons an ancient
form of conscientious objection. The exemption under Jewish law is qualified, however,
as it does not apply to a "required war," defined as capturing Israeli land or defending her
borders. In that instance, all physically-able individuals are required to participate. Id.
Hence, the Jewish law adopts a practical standard, not centered on the individual's
morals, which allows selective objection to a particular form of war.
64. Id. at 401. The Court referred to John Rawis' A Theory of Justice, as Shein
relied on Rawls to emphasize his reason why the formalistic tenets of the law should not
3031993]
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security situation. The Court, therefore, never conducted a rational
evaluation of Shein's beliefs. The army could have at least initially
reviewed Shein's background in considering his objection. This would
have allowed for a more extensive evaluation by the Court, if not of
military procedures, at least of the petitioner's claim.65
3. Issues Raised by the Israeli Supreme Court's Decisions
Will the Israeli army ever allow for conscientious objection, in light
of the broad justification of "military necessity?" More importantly, is the
Israeli Supreme Court conducting a proper analysis of the conscientious
objection issue by focusing solely on an objective external aspect and not
on the subjective internal beliefs of the objector? The answers to these
questions will become discernable once both the underlying force behind
conscientious objection and the reasons for a state to even grant a
conscientious objector the standing to challenge a state's law are better
understood.66
III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: INDIVIDUAL MORALS
AND STATE INTERESTS
A. Decision Process of the Objector
A conscientious objector can be defined as one who believes that
performing a legal act would involve a grave moral wrong, even if that
always apply in a such a rigid or automatic manner. RAwLS, supra note 9, at 363-91.
65. The military necessity argument will be altered as a result of the peace agreement
between Israel and the PLO. See, e.g., Tal Shachaf, LD.F. Presents for the First 7Ime:
A Ledger of Rights for All Military Reservists, MA'ARIV (Tel Aviv), Feb. 2, 1994, at 6
(describing the lesser periods of reserve duty and decreased manpower requirements in the
army).
66. Note that this analysis might be perceived as a natural law approach as the law
should conform to the individual's moral standards. A legal positivist does not recognize
a logical nexus between morals and law since the law exists in an objectivist legal state.
DAVID RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRrrICISMS OF THE LAW 25 (1977). While this
discussion centers more on the morals of the law and the possible reasons for obeying, it
is not meant to discount the positivist argument which recognizes the right to
conscientiously object. The core of the distinction is based on the legal claim for
obedience, which can only be usurped if the law allows one to do so, as opposed to a
moral reason, which grants one the right to disobey the law. RAZ, supra note 9, at 233;
see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 206 (1961). Hence, the analysis could
apply to a positivist perspective as well.
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person is not certain of the moral righteousness of his views."' The act of
conscientious objection plays an integral part in upholding one's role as a
virtuous citizen. A state directive is examined to determine whether the
order properly conforms to one's perception of the state.68  A
conscientious objector has the discretion to determine that the state order
is outside the realm of the pre-determined role for the individual, and
therefore, should be disobeyed. The conscientious objector reaches this
decision by recognizing that the morally preferable choice is not to act.69
An individual's conscientious decision is the result of a reflective and
purposeful process. The objector evaluates his morals in the context of his
personal beliefs, the laws, the community's moral standards, as well as
higher moral standards. 70 Because the conscientious objector views the
state as imposing a morally abhorrent law, he refuses to elect the morally
worse alternative. 71 The conscientious objector is motivated by his own
moral beliefs. The Israeli Supreme Court made light of the moral issue
by justifying military policy and not recognizing the individual's reliance
on internal motivations.
At first glance, one might consider that permitting conscientious
objection would lead to anarchy within the state.72  However,
conscientious objection is not an exercise of free will. By exercising free
will, one acts out a desire, conscientiously or not. 73  A conscientious
objector is motivated to act from a moral standpoint. This action could be
made even if free will did not exist.74 For the conscientious objector,
disobeying a law does not discount the general notion that law will be
obeyed.75
67. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 313 (1987). A grave
moral wrong is measured by what the objector is willing to suffer rather than performing
the act. In the case of a military objector, Greenawalt states that the individual should
consider military service a moral wrong where he views death to be preferable over killing
an enemy soldier. Id.
68. SANFORD KADISH & MORTIMER KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 26-31 (1973).
69. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 313. See also RAz, supra note 9, at 263.
70. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality-Institutions of Amelioration,
67 VA. L. REv. 177, 179 (1981).
71. Id. at 180.
72. An underlying fear of the Israeli Supreme Court and the military in Shein was
that should conscientious objection be allowed, other individuals would attempt to escape
army duty in this manner. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 401.
73. WILLiAM D. LAMONT, LAW AND THE MORAL ORDER 83-87 (1981).
74. Free will can, however, be a basis for calling conscience into action.
75. M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE
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Conscientious objection is not a frivolous decision. The objector
considers the proper action to take to a greater degree than does the
average soldier. Although the legality of the act of objection is an issue
to be reviewed by a court or a military authority, the decision-making
body should at least consider the conscientious objector's motivations for
objecting to military service.
The Israeli military does not acknowledge the conscientious objector's
contribution to society, those being the expression of his moral views as
well as the addition to society's moral foundation. A conscientious
objector attempts to solidify the moral underpinnings of society, since he
acts under a perceived morally justified reason.7 6 Individual moral beliefs
are a dimension of a state's composition as they contribute towards
shaping the overall morals of society and the state." The unique quality
of a social order that values individual rights is the recognition of the right
to harbor moral beliefs.7" An example of disobedience is, at times,
necessary in society as a means of expressing different views and allowing
such diversity of thought to exist and to flourish.79 An individual who
adheres to a moral obligation advances justice even though he disobeys a
law; otherwise, individual free thought within society would be stifled.8"
When an individual deems that disobedience is necessary, the state should
recognize the petitioner's right to conscientiously object because the
objector is merely a vehicle by which the social order's moral outlook is
shaped and formed.8"
Although it is difficult to gauge such effects, the consequence to
society in disallowing a conscientious objector to adhere to a belief has
similar implications and justifications as allowing conscientious objector
status. The conscientious objector cannot recognize what is perceived as
L. REv. 950, 969 (1973).
76. Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 182.
77. This is not to discount the effect and importance of group action on the state.
Rather, it is to point out that in either case, the individual action will have an effect on
the synthesis of the state's composition.
78. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 389-90.
79. RAZ, supra note 9, at 241-42.
80. David A.J. Richards, Conscience, Human Rights and the Anarchist Challenge to
the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771, 779-80 (1984) (discussing the
anarchist's view and his contribution to the democratic state).
81. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 32-33. This is not to say that a state
should not enforce a punishment to deter others who might act for insincere reasons. Ex
post, the ruling authority can no doubt impose a punishment; however, only after the state
first recognizes the right of the conscientious objector to disobey.
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an impermissible violation of a basic moral right. If an individual
determines that the moral obligation of the law is not in accordance with
his own moral beliefs, it is implicit that the individual can disobey the law
as a means of determining and shaping the moral character of the state. 2
Notwithstanding the fear of anarchy, the authoritative body should also be
concerned with the degree that military dominance or control suppresses
the individual voice.
While one consideration is the contribution that the conscientious
objector offers to the state, another aspect of conscientious objection,
which was recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court, is the practical
consequence the decision will have on others. If one believes the right to
disobey the law exists, one must also examine whether it is correct to
exercise the right in light of the impact it will have on others.13 The
conscientious objector's action should not reach the point of violating the
rights of others."4 Should the conscientious objector's views conflict with
those of others, further evaluation and inquiry should be conducted
regarding what the objector is being subjected to and why the law was
disobeyed.
Thus, as part of his decision to object, the conscientious objector will
inherently take into account his impact on others. Conscience recognizes
that one's acts will undoubtedly have an effect on others.8 5 Furthermore,
while this impact is a factor,86 the moral consequence is just as strong a
consideration. The application of these conflicting considerations would
depend on the circumstances; however, the authoritative body should
weigh them equally in making a determination. Solely focusing on the
reasoning of the authoritative body 7 essentially precludes the individual
from ever being permitted to act in accordance with a decision of
conscience. The authority can always claim an overriding interest or
82. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 383; see also id. at 381 (noting that if unjust military
commands are received, one may not only possess a right, but also a duty, to desist taking
part in the military action).
83. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 196 (1978).
84. Id.
85. AMES F. CHILDRESS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFLICTS (1982) (arguing that
conscience is not solely an internal standard but arises after the individual has made a
proper judgment).
86. No doubt, the conscientious objector's actions also will have to be justified within
society. See infra note 110 (discussing whether an individual possesses sufficient moral
grounds to disobey the law).
87. For example, in Israel, the military has denied a conscientious objection claim
for reasons of military necessity.
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concern.88 The contention here is not that the conscientious objector is
always correct in refusing to adhere to an immoral edict. Rather, it is
imperative for the Israeli Supreme Court to recognize that a moral
dilemma for the individual exists that should merit some consideration. 9
The fundamental question is whether one possesses the ability to exercise
a right to conscientiously object in light of the consequences to others.
The free rider problem associated with the conscientious objector is
also a consideration, since others are required to carry out difficult tasks
in lieu of the objector. As noted in Shein, one of the justifications for the
Israeli military's denial of conscientious objection was the effect upon the
unit and upon the overall military structure.' ° Nonetheless, the Court
failed to account for both the importance of the conscientious objector's
moral considerations and the objector's equal footing with his fellow
citizens who do serve in the military via the punishment the objector
receives.9 This ensures fairness between the actors in that the
conscientious objector is not shirking a duty but is either performing it in
a different manner or is being punished for refusing to act.92 The
conscientious objector is placed in at least an equal position to fellow unit
members. In military prison, the objector is subjected to harsh conditions
and denied the governmental benefits that other army personnel receive. 93
More importantly, however, the conscientious objector should be put to
better use by serving in other capacities within the army that are just as
harsh (thereby equalizing the burden), rather than remaining in jail and
acting as a drain on public resources.'
88. A similar point was noted by Justice Cohen in Elgazi. H.C. 470/80, supra note
15, at 5.
89. See SHELEFF, supra note 9, at 140-41 ("No doubt, an army is not obligated to
deal with every request of a soldier, however it is not obligated to ignore it; the Israeli
army is always attentive to the personal problems of its soldiers regarding administering
orders, personal conflicts, and education and absorption issues.").
90. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 399.
91. Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 202-03. This is something that the conscientious
objector accepts. This will also deter fraudulent conscientious objector claims in that
those who do not desire to submit to the punishment will not claim conscientious objection
status. Id. at 203-04. Greenawalt suggests that in the case of conscientious objection
versus the military, a civilian service duty should be instituted in place of military service
to the degree that such service equates the experience with military duty. Id. at 205-06.
92. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 317.
93. For example, reimbursement of salary while serving in the reserves.
94. See H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 4 (where the justification for military
necessity is questioned should the remedy entail placing a conscientious objector in jail
instead of serving in some other capacity). See also Sasha Sadan et al., 20,000 Jobless
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In Elgazi, the Court suggested forcing the conscientious objector to
serve in the Occupied Territories as a means of ensuring that commands
are up to moral standards.9 However, this ignores the conscientious
objector's reason for refusing to perform. The objector's noncompliance
is due to the inability to carry out the act, ex ante-not to alter the moral
policy of the military. 9 Forcing a conscientious objector to undergo a
morally abhorrent act would appear to create more dilemmas for an army
and would prevent the conscientious objector from contributing to society
in some other positive manner. Not only is it unclear whether such
individuals are even fit for duty, but an army must also consider whether
it desires the participation of soldiers who do not believe in the cause for
which they are fighting. 97 Given the Israeli military's fear of dissension,
it would seem to be in its interests to dissuade a conscientious objector
from joining its ranks. An additional concern would be that, should an
individual object to a particular military action, fellow unit members may
not want the individual to serve, fearing that such service may pose a
danger to their lives. 98
The military's imprisonment policy, which has been condoned by the
Court, is troubling in cases such as Shein, where the underlying rationale
of a conscientious objector and the subsequent punishment that was
received, were ignored. Shein, a conscientious objector who was acting
for moral reasons, was not entitled to credit his jail sentence towards
reserve duty. On the other hand, the sentence imposed upon an army
criminal (an individual convicted of committing a crime while serving in
the military), who is not acting out of moral resolve, may be regarded as
reserve duty.
The individual criminal now has an incentive99 to commit a crime
while serving in the army, and then, spend the entire period in prison. It
to Replace Banned Workers, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 5, 1993, at 3 (reporting that reserve
soldiers worked in the fields in the Occupied Territories to assist farmers who were
injured by striking Arab workers and could not collect their crops).
95. H.C. 470/80, supra note 15, at 4.
96. Although this might be a positive result for the conscientious objector.
97. A similar point was noted by Justice Cohen in Elgazi. H.C. 470/80, supra note
15, at 4.
98. Note that I am not condoning a utilitarian argument by focusing on the proper
function of the army. Rather, I am attempting to address the necessity contentions that
the Court and the military relied upon in denying conscientious objector status.
99. Assuming the common criminal is one who is breaching the law in an immoral
fashion and whose effects on military order would appear to be more severe than a
conscientious objector.
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would seem preferable for a state to favor rational and conscientious
individuals, who, by assessing the moral implications of their actions,
create a greater awareness and respect in society for an individual's
rights." ° Where a conscientious objector acts on moral grounds and
without criminal intent to violate a law, a state should be inclined to
impose, at the most, an equal punishment for that individual.'' A
question that arises is that of a soldier who refuses, for reasons of
conscience, to carry out an order while serving in the military."0 2 Could
it then be said that the period in jail should count towards service? If not,
the Israeli military would seem to be acting in a discriminatory manner.
An important distinction exists between conscientious objection and
civil disobedience. This distinction should have been recognized and
analyzed accordingly, by the Court and military. Significantly, the
underlying purposes of these actions are as different as the intended effects
on the state and its citizens.' 03 The primary objective of the individual
who practices civil disobedience is to invoke the concept of justice
underlying the political purpose of changing a law via a concerted group
action. "0 A practitioner of civil disobedience refuses to obey the law, due
to the unwillingness to recognize that it should endure. Conscientious
objection is merely an expression of an individual's moral belief. The
individual has no desire to systematically change the political outlook, and
his act is not intended to take place in a public forum. Rather, the
objector refuses to obey an existing law that violates his moral convictions.
The central issue of conscientious objection is the individual's belief.
When a state suppresses civil disobedience on the grounds of preventing
dissent or even a revolt, the military necessity argument might retain more
credence. However, where the individual's action is an expression of a
100. DWORKIN, supra note 83, at 207.
101. Especially since punishment for the latter is to reform and the conscientious
objector is acting out of moral resolve. Greenawalt, supra note 70, at 184.
102. Assuming the order is "lawful" by military standards. If it was an illegal order,
the soldier should not be held accountable for the action. See Defence Service Law § 125
(Isr.). Note that one of the contentions of the "Yesh Gevul" members is that a catch-22
situation has been created for the soldier serving in the occupied territories. The soldier
can either refuse military orders and be incarcerated or conduct such orders and be subject
to an investigation and possible prison. See YESH GEVUL PAMPHLET, supra note 55.
103. Note that Shein also failed to adequately distinguish his 'claim between that of
a civil disobedient and conscientious objector. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 395. This affected
Shein's argument since it provided a basis on which to dismiss his claim due to the fear
of an outbreak of civil disobedience, a public, group-oriented, action.
104. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 364-65.
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belief, the military's justification for limiting the conscientious objector for
reasons centering on widespread refusal or dissent would not seem
relevant. Furthermore, revolt should not occur, since conscientious
objection can transpire without anyone being aware.10 5  Whether the
occurrence of objection actually will cause others to object depends on the
surrounding circumstances.
Another type of conscientious objector is the individual who objects
to a particular war or military action. In Shein, the Israeli Supreme Court
dismissed the conscientious objector's claims on the ground that he
morally objected to a particular war, rather than war in general." The
Court held that selective objection was a politically tainted posture that
would cause discrimination and thwart military justice. 0 7 Theoretically,
however, a conscientious objector is not attempting to create a political
statement, but is asserting a moral belief."0 8 When an individual's
objections to a specific war are politically motivated, the objections are
geared towards a specific social change. The individual cannot participate
because the actions that are to be carried out in the military operation are
morally repugnant to the objector.109
In light of the rationale underlying a conscientious objector's actions,
the Israeli Supreme Court did not completely consider the subjective
reasons for a conscientious objector's actions. Nonetheless, once it is
recognized that some credence should be granted to the individual's
convictions, the question arises whether the state should recognize an
individual's decision when it conflicts with a state law? The inherent
moral obligation to obey the law considered in light of an individual's
conscience can present a significant conflict for a state which aspires to
grant its citizen's rights, but at the same time desires to prevent anarchy.'
105. RAZ, supra note 9, at 238.
106. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (containing a similar
holding).
107. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 402-03.
108. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 382.
109. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 326-27; see also SHELEFF, supra note 9, at 136
(noting that most conscientious objection actions will have political ramifications and that
at times it will be difficult to distinguish between political and conscientious actions).
110. See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 68, at 7-9 (noting that it is not sufficient to
justify an action based on merit, as it is essential that the actions of an agent (here, the
citizen against the military) be appropriate in the context of the state as well). This
section discussed the merits as to how the societal elements are outweighed by the
individual's choice. The forthcoming section will focus on the notion that one is justified
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IV. TIE OBLIGATION TO OBEY
Any reason that may be founded on moral belief for an individual to
obey a law would suggest that just as valid a reason exists to disobey the
law. From a moral standpoint, it is implicit that if the law is obeyed on
moral grounds, then the law can also be disobeyed should it abridge a
conflicting set of morals. In the conflict between adherence to one's
morals or to a state's law, no logical basis exists to conclude that one
outweighs the other.
The social contract theory has been advanced as a justification for
obeying the law, regardless of an individual's moral beliefs. Assuming
the contract is valid, then even immoral laws would be upheld."' From
a practical standpoint, how can society collectively accept such a social
contract? It would seem that members of society, including individuals
who are aware of the contract's supposed existence, did not actively accept
the contract. From a purely contractual position, it does not seem possible
that the social contract can actually exist as a binding obligation on all
members of society. The duty was never undertaken, since there was no
tacit or implicit agreement among the members of society to obey."'
Assuming the contract does exist, the obligations of the actual contract
would, at best, seem to be in the form of some vague understanding.
Basing one's obligation to obey the law on such a weak contract would
actually lessen the undertaken obligation, rather than serve as a reason for
upholding the law. 1
Relying on the contract theory of estoppel to uphold the obligation
arising under the social contract would only apply where an injury
occurred due to another's reliance on the promise to obey the law. This
argument is tenuous, since proving an individual's detrimental reliance or
that an injury actually occurred is difficult.
Hence, imposing contract principles on the conscientious objector does
not create a binding obligation that requires the objector to obey the law.
The conscientious objector cannot breach a contract that has never been
formally adopted and whose terms are not explicit enough to communicate
what should be obeyed. The estoppel theory raises the issue of who was
relying on the conscientious objector and who was harmed. The Israeli
in taking the action. Dismissing the reasons for an individual to obey a legal obligation
indicates that the converse, disobeying a law, is proper in certain instances.
111. Smith, supra note 75, at 976.
112. RAZ, supra note 9, at 239.
113. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 86, 87.
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Supreme Court focused on this point and the delicate security situation in
Israel as justifications for upholding the military necessity argument." 4
Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess the actual harm caused by the
conscientious objector to state security' 15 and the degree and form of
reliance by the military prior to the objector's actions." 6
Another reason for requiring individuals to obey the law is based on
utilitarian grounds. Society needs the law as a means of imposing order
and cannot exist without it. This reasoning, however, can lead to a
reductio ad absurdum. 7 A state can justify a ludicrous directive on the
grounds that anarchy or chaos is to be prevented. Furthermore, once it
is determined that the law is, or could be, immoral, obedience is not the
definitive optimal outcome."' Is it correct to conclude that some law is
better than no law at all? Were the laws of Nazi Germany better than no
laws at all? Although they presented a utilitarian purpose in ensuring
societal order, the laws that were imposed and state edicts that were
carried out in Nazi Germany were arbitrary and immoral. The idea that
society might require legal directives does not mean that they should be
implemented in all instances." 9
A conscientious objector questions the utility of the law from a moral
standpoint. Disobedience might be appropriate in light of the possibility
of immoral laws.'2 ' A conscientious objector who adheres to such laws
will not definitively satisfy the needs of society, therefore, the individual's
obligation will not necessarily be required.
114. Shein, 30(3) P.D. at 403. The effect on fellow unit members would seem to
be a dubious reason at best, because the reliance of unit members prior to commencing
reserve or army duty is doubtful. The reliance would seem to exist with the military
authorities in this instance.
115. Actual harm to state security was a central concern of the Court.
116. Note that in the Israeli Supreme Court decisions, reliance was neither claimed
nor demonstrated before the Court. Also note that the military reliance argument is
weakened in light of the recent recognition by Israel of the PLO and the peace agreement
to return portions of the Occupied Territories. See, e.g., Richard Beeston, Israel Cuts
Army Reserve to Reap Peace Dividend, THE TwEs (London), Sept. 30, 1993, at 15
(noting the possibility that the government might reduce reserve forces and/or rescind the
draft for both economic and social reasons).
117. Smith, supra note 75, at 966.
118. Id. at 967.
119. SHELEFF, supra note 9, at 114.
120. This is similar to the symmetrical dichotomy. See supra notes 76-81 and
accompanying text. The fact that society needs the law does not mean that such a purpose
will be met by obeying the law. Instances will exist whereby disobeying the law will
further the needs of society as well.
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The Israeli Supreme Court, basing its decision on military necessity,
seemed to rely on the utilitarian mode of reasoning. The military, for the
sake of order, imposed its will on society to ensure that all personnel obey
orders. The Israeli Supreme Court decisions do not discuss whether the
conscientious objector's actions would lead to undesirable alternatives for
society, such as anarchy. The minimal benefits, which might be gained
by denying conscientious objection status, seem to be counterbalanced
against the difficulties encountered by forced service of conscientious
objectors. Furthermore, the conscientious objector recognizes the
military's authority to carry out directives and is willing to submit to
sanctions. The objector does not intend to destroy the military's
infrastructure.
Another common reason invoked for denying conscientious objection
is that it is unfair to other members of society who are obeying the law. 122
However, there is no proof that the law is to be imposed on everyone in
an equal manner. In many instances, people are treated differently under
the law. In the military, for example, an individual can be ordered to
serve on reserve duty for different periods of time or in more difficult
areas.123 The claim of unfairness is valid only if the law as a whole is
unfair to everyone, not just to a select number of individuals. If this were
not the case, the claim of unfairness could be raised by anyone violating
the law. This notion of fair play among society turns on whether an actual
harm is being caused by the disobedience. 124 If the disobedience has a
harmful effect on others, it is questionable whether the conscientious
objector can act. Further evaluation is then warranted by the conscientious
objector and the determining body. 125 No automatic obligation to obey the
law is created.
121. Both in a physical and moral sense.
122. Note that this differs from the argument that the conscientious objector's actions
will have an effect on other individuals. See DWORKIN, supra note 83. In the latter
instance, the argument centers on the unfairness to those who obey the law. The previous
discussion dealt with the direct effect that a conscientious objector's actions would have
on specific individuals who bore the consequences of the conscientious objector's actions
since these individuals were now required to conduct the same action, or because their
duties were increased due to the conscientious objector's inaction.
123. This claim focuses on the inherent limitations of the authority that enforces the
law upon the individuals who compose society.
124. Smith, supra note 75, at 956.
125. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 370 ("In general, the degree of tolerance accorded
opposing moral conceptions depends upon the extent to which they can be allowed an
equal place within a just system of liberty.").
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Certain individuals might feel an inherent or underlying sense of duty
to the government or ruling authority due to the benefits that are bestowed
upon them. This sense of duty is related to the notion of good faith efforts
by rulers who are imposing authority for the interests of the community. 126
The Israeli Supreme Court referred to this notion when it deferred to the
military's decision to act as it deemed proper. The Court held that the
individual has a duty to obey, since the military is imposing authority in
a suitable manner. However, the fact that an authority is merely fulfilling
its appointed tasks does not create an obligation to obey the law. The
relationship is not symbiotic in all instances, since the authority should act
in good faith regardless of the circumstances. The same is not necessarily
true of the individual. The fact that an individual might obey or disobey
a law is not connected to the good faith execution of governmental duties.
The fundamental issue is with the law. 127
V. CONCLUSION
Conscientious objection presents a difficult problem for a state that
relies on its military for protection and security. However, conscientious
objection is just as troubling a dilemma for the individual. A soldier must
confront situations that are morally questionable, thereby allowing the
individual to justifiably refuse to heed such orders.
Although the Israeli Supreme Court recognized the difficulties faced
by the individual, the Court granted wide latitude to the military to
objectively decide conscientious objection claims. The military must re-
assess the role of the individual within its infrastructure. For the military
to unilaterally dictate policy by disregarding the individual's moral stance
is a radical and troubling maneuver in a democratic society. 2 '
126. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 80 (1984).
127. The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive list of analytical reasons for the
obligation to obey the law. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 9, at 250-53 (arguing that the
obligation to obey the law is based on respect). The obligation of respect only applies to
one who initially accepts the full obligation of the law, without assessing every situation
that may arise. See also LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1990)
(analyzing the grounds for the state authority, which can arise independently from the
individual obligation to obey the law).
128. This is especially the case in light of the perception of conscientious objection
to military service as an international human right. See, e.g., Conscientious Objection to
Military Service, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E.S.C. Res. 1989/59, U.N.
ESCOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 139, U.N. Doc. E/1989/20 E/CN.4/1989/86 (1989)
(recommending that states recognize the right to conscientious objection).
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To evaluate the role of the individual within the military, all issues
must be adequately addressed. In its conscientious objection decisions, the
Israeli Supreme Court has not recognized the importance of the
individual's actions or the ramifications of justifying the standards
established by the military. While conscientious objection is permitted,
the elements examined by the Court do not effectively decide the
conscientious objection issue. The individual's underlying rationale for
objecting to the military is overlooked by the Court, while the military
conducts a unilateral analysis of its needs, without accounting for the
individual's perspective. The conscientious objector takes a moral stance
based on his inner beliefs. Where the individual acts solely on those
grounds, the individual should be allowed some flexibility to abide by
these convictions. This is not to say that the law should be ignored in all
situations. Rather, it is to point out that in certain instances the benefits
of obeying the law can be outweighed by the individual's moral principles.
